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Opinion of AG Sharpston (12 December 2013) and Grand Chamber Judgment (12 March 2014) 
in Cases C-456/12 O and B and C-457/12 S and G  
 
The O and B; S and G cases concern the lawful residence of third-country national (TCN) family 
members of Dutch Union citizens who left the Netherlands. It is the Netherlands where these family 
members now claim residency. The cases were jointly decided on 12 March 2014, but of most interest 
is the Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered three months earlier. The question of TCN family derived 
rights of residency has been a regular feature of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s 
preliminary rulings in recent years since the seminal Zambrano case—testament to the problems 
concerning a flagrant lack of clarity as to when a legally resident Union citizen’s family may invoke 
fundamental rights. This has become a topic of much contention in recent years, and is the reason for a 
particular interest in the Opinion. AG Sharpston had previously requested that the Court define its clear 
intentions in terms whether or not it believes that fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter ‘the Charter’) and those in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) are free-standing, or if they still require the increasingly fictitious cross-border 
element to be triggered.1 The post-Zambrano developments seemed to have made AG Sharpston change 
her tune on this matter, as evidenced by this Opinion. 
  
The Charter and Free-Standing Fundamental Rights 
The British Advocate General is infamous for her extremely thorough analysis of situations. It is 
therefore unsurprising that she took the opportunity to raise such a number of issues in this Opinion. 
She began by questioning the role of fundamental rights in citizenship in the context of residency rights 
and family reunification by firstly expressing her disdain for ad hoc solutions. The Court seems to 
favour this method in citizenship (para 44), inciting AG Sharpston’s puzzlement at the fact that there 
has been such an open-ended question remaining as to the application of such rights. The possibility 
that there may now be three bases for claiming rights under EU law in citizenship—the rights to free 
movement and residency (Art 21(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), the 
right to privacy and family life (Art 7 Charter) and deprivation of genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship 
rights (Art 20 TFEU)—in her eyes is not the solution. 
AG Sharpston made it clear that, ‘at present at least, the Charter does not grant “free-standing” 
fundamental rights’ (para 60). She opined that when the Treaty is triggered by Article 20 or 21 TFEU, 
citizenship has to be ‘Charter-compliant’ (para 62). It is consistent with not extending the scope of EU 
law (something the Charter protects against in Article 51(2)) and also upholds the declaration that 
citizenship is to be the fundamental status of all EU citizens as first mentioned by the Court in Grzelczyk. 
                                                          
1 C-60/00 Carpenter [2001] ECR I-6279; C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; C-384/93 Alpine [1995] ECR 
I-1141. 
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This is provocative because her perspectives on this seem to have changed to be consistent with the 
case law. 
 
Free movement  
AG Sharpston considered that the Citizens Rights Directive 2004/38 did not apply because the 
legislation does not cover movement from another Member State back to one’s home Member State 
(para 79). However, she referred instead to Article 21 TFEU, and stated that restrictions on free 
movement actually extend to impositions as well as negative obligations, in the context of family 
reunification. Referring to Singh and Eind which pre-date the Directive (Singh even pre-dating Union 
citizenship itself), AG Sharpston agreed that the same rights should be granted because ‘the home 
Member State cannot treat its own nationals returning to reside on its territory less favourably than the 
treatment they enjoyed as EU citizens in the host Member State’ (para 95). 
 
Residence 
AG Sharpston noted that the ‘hypothetical prospect’ of triggering rights, whether positively or 
negatively, is insufficient to establish a connection with EU law (para 50). This definitive statement 
translates to a necessary demonstration of legal residency and movement to trigger rights under the 
Treaty. However, she strongly believed that this idea of length of residence—the duration of which 
differed in the four situations at hand—‘cannot be applied as an absolute threshold’, though it is a 
‘relevant quantitative criterion’ (para 111). Therefore, it is considered that minimum time spent in 
residence, interruptions to residence (regular or irregular), time spent moving back and forth between 
Member States and reasons for movement (whether as a frontier worker or for contracted employment 
reasons) are all inconclusive in denying TCNs derived family rights of residency. 
 
Postscript 
A unique feature of this Opinion comes in the form of a postscript (para 158). Throughout her Opinion, 
AG Sharpston identified several tangential issues to the case which need attention. Therefore, in her 
postscript, she urged the Court not to ignore these problems, asking them 
 
to give clear and structured guidance as to the circumstances in which the third 
country national family member of an EU citizen who is residing in his home 
Member State but who is exercising his rights of free movement can claim a derived 
right of residence in the home Member State under EU law. 
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Judgment 
The Court framed the Netherlands’ preliminary ruling as follows: do Directive 2004/38 and Article 
21(1) TFEU prevent a TCN family member of a Union citizen from deriving residency in the Union 
citizen’s original home Member State after the Union citizen and the family member moved away, but 
have now decided to return? After clarifying in paragraph 37 that the Directive does not cover this 
particular situation (a point AG Sharpston also noted), the Court turned to Article 21(1) TFEU and the 
cases of Singh and Eind, which concerned similar situations decided pre-Directive. Paragraph 55 
confirms that the Union citizen has the right to enjoy the same family life in their home Member State 
as they did in their host one, as long as the Union citizen enjoyed a genuine residence which created 
and strengthened their family life. This should not be stricter than the conditions laid out in the Directive 
for derived TCN family member residence; hence it is applied by analogy.  
In terms of the questions raised and clarification on points of the Directive’s application, the Court was 
very clear and formalistic. The judges seemed to consider the reasons AG Sharpston presented in her 
Opinion for applying the Directive by analogy to the situation at hand. The principle of non-
discrimination, citizenship and free movement principles underpinned the reasoning of the Court. In 
this sense, the judgment resembles a classic decision on Union citizenship finding expression through 
free movement of workers and is relatively uncontroversial. 
However, there is an evident disparity in the way AG Sharpston addressed the case and how the Court 
decided to approach it, somewhat indicative of the Court’s hesitance to engage with some of the more 
sensitive and difficult questions the Opinion strongly urged them to clarify (Opinion, para 158). The 
bulk of the judgment focused on the first three questions posed for preliminary ruling which centred 
around Directive 2004/38 and Article 21(1) TFEU’s interpretation of derived residency. While 
confirming that the Directive does not cover situations where the Union citizen re-joins his or her 
partner in their home Member States after leaving, the Court nonetheless extended Article 21(1) 
TFEU’s scope to protect them. However, this was the extent of its discussion. 
 
Comment 
While the judgment cannot be overly criticised for its logical approach to questions regarding the 
Directive’s application, it is troubling that yet again, despite AG Sharpston’s gentle request, the Court 
failed to engage with the fundamental rights–citizenship dichotomy. The situation is underlined by her 
unique addition of a postscript, exacerbating the effect of the Court’s decision to ignore this. Though 
the Court has yet to convey its express intentions for the relationship, the AG did in O and B; S and G, 
declaring that fundamental rights are not free-standing. This suggests that she had resigned herself to 
the decisions made in McCarthy and Dereci, sentiments which were not present in her Zambrano 
Opinion. It represents acquiescence to the passive interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty’s fundamental 
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rights influence on citizenship, rather than the tacit judicial activism which she previously suggested 
may be a possibility for the Court in the Zambrano Opinion. 
Because the Court decided not to address fundamental rights in the judgment and the AG clarified that 
there are no free-standing fundamental rights, there is still legal uncertainty as to whether the right to 
private and family life will be enough on its own to grant residency rights for TCN family members of 
Union citizens. Though a link to EU law was established in the case at hand, thus requiring 
consideration of the Charter, the Court did not mention this aspect in its judgment. AG Sharpston also 
called for a ‘Charter-compliant’ holistic consideration of TCN rights of residency. It would appear that 
while the decision made by the Court is sound, it is more what it did not say that is of importance. There 
is still the unanswered question of when exactly fundamental rights will come into play for Union 
citizens with TCN family members when invoking their citizenship rights. It is unclear whether the 
Court will ever be prepared to give a definitive answer to this question, and until then speculation from 
Advocates General and commentators will build. 
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